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This Development Viewpoint draws on extensive research by 
Marois and Güngen (2013) to assess the continuing relevance of 
state-owned banks (SOBs) in promoting Turkey’s development. 
SOBs have been under attack, in general, in recent decades as 
conventional economists have argued for their market-oriented 
restructuring or their outright privatisation. Yet they continue to 
play a progressive role in dozens of countries around the world 
as effective instruments for the financing of vital public services 
and infrastructure, SMEs, and agriculture (see also Marois 2013).
The History of SOBs in Turkey
In Turkey state-owned banks have a long history. And, despite 
current efforts to privatise or restructure them, state-owned 
banks continue, nevertheless, to play an important develop-
mental role. Today three large state-owned commercial banks 
and three small state-owned development banks still exist. 
State banks have existed since the founding of the Turkish 
Republic in 1923. During their peak activity in the 1960s they 
played a major role in financing the country’s development 
strategy. At that time they accounted for over 70% of the assets 
of the financial sector and their loans far outstripped those of 
private domestic banks and foreign banks combined.
Thereafter there were sustained efforts to liberalise the finan-
cial sector and privatise the SOBs. In the 1980s, for example, a 
military coup led to neoliberal reforms that favoured financial 
liberalisation. But by the mid-1990s recurrent financial crises 
undermined political commitments to such neoliberal reforms. 
In the face of such crises, Turkey’s ruling political coalitions 
started in the mid 1990s to utilise the SOBs as a convenient fi-
nancial cover to hide the mounting fiscal deficits of the govern-
ment. By 1999, these deficits had swelled indeed to 13% of GNP. 
The exposure of these public deficits together with the ascen-
dency of speculative private banking practices triggered a ma-
jor financial crisis in Turkey in 2000-2001. In the process, the 
state-owned banks were blamed for a crisis for which they were 
not, in fact, solely responsible, and were thereby compelled to 
undergo further market-oriented restructuring. 
The government’s Banking Sector Restructuring Program, ini-
tiated in 2001, immediately demanded the financial reorgan-
isation of the SOBs and sought thereafter to gear them to the
Source: BAT online (July 2013)
imperatives of market efficiency and profitability. The ultimate 
goal of this Program was to privatise the state-owned banks.
The Current State of SOBs
Despite such setbacks, as of late 2011, the three large com-
mercial banks that remained primarily publicly owned still 
represented the second, sixth and seventh largest banks in the 
country. Their combined assets, which equaled about US$180.5 
billion, still represented almost 30% of assets in the financial 
sector (see Table 1). In addition, all six SOBs, including the de-
velopment banks, were generating positive net incomes. 
Table 1. Turkey’s State-Owned Banks, end 2011
Bank Total 
Assets
(US$ 
million)
Percentage 
of Total 
Sector 
Assets
Sector 
Ranking
Ziraat 85,066 13.8 2nd
Halkbank 48,242 7.9 6th
VakıfBank 47,215 7.7 7th
İller 6,031 1.0 14th
Eximbank 5,114 0.8 15th
Kalkınma 1,479 0.2 24th
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In contrast, the three small development banks accounted for 
a mere 2% of the banking sector’s assets in 2011. In fact, de-
velopment banks, which are specialised institutions that do not 
accept deposits, have never played a prominent financial role 
in Turkey. Instead, successive governments have preferred sup-
porting large state-owned deposit-taking commercial banks 
that have had a clearly mandated developmental orientation. 
Despite criticism of Turkey’s state-owned banks and their sub-
sequent restructuring, have they still provided a viable and 
valuable alternative to the private financing of development 
activities? 
Following is an assessment based on extensive research and 
interviews conducted in the country during 2013. The conclu-
sion of this assessment is that state-owned banks have, in fact, 
played a progressive financial role in at least five different ways. 
Assessing Turkey’s SOBs 
First, the SOBs have been invaluable vehicles through which di-
rect government transfers have been able to finance the provi-
sion of low-interest credits to priority development activities, 
particularly in the agricultural, SME, municipal infrastructure, 
and energy fields.
Second, the SOBs have played a critical role during times of 
crisis and instability in Turkey by purposively expanding, in a 
counter-cyclical fashion, their loan portfolios. Such interven-
tions have helped counteract the debilitating withdrawal of 
lending by private banks and have thus prevented larger reces-
sions. 
Third, one of the most important contributions of SOBs has 
been the provision of a nationwide financial network of nearly 
3,000 branches. This service has been especially important in 
rural areas and small towns, where private profit-seeking banks 
have been reluctant to set up offices.
Fourth, the Turkish population generally regards the SOBs as 
a ‘safe haven’ for their savings deposits—partly, of course, be-
cause of implicit or explicit state guarantees. This view was evi-
dent, for example, during Turkey’s financial crisis in 2008-2009 
when the public flooded the SOBs with their savings.
As a result of such trends, by 2012 Turkey’s state-owned banks 
handled nearly 57 million savings accounts, or more than half 
of the country’s total. On its own, Ziraat, the largest of the SOBs, 
handled nearly 42 million accounts. As a result, the government 
has not been obliged to rely solely on unreliable private domes-
tic or foreign capital for its financing needs.
Lastly, the operations of the state-owned banks in Turkey have 
been just as efficient as private banks, if not more efficient at 
least in development terms. The SOB rate of return on assets 
(ROA) has been at least comparable to that of private banks, 
with the formers’ average ROA since 2001 having ranged be-
tween 1.5% and 2.5%. 
Moreover, unlike many private banks, state-owned banks have 
duly paid their taxes to the government. And they have recy-
cled their profits back into public revenue. These practices have 
helped contribute to the reduction of the government’s debt in 
recent years. 
Concluding Remarks 
Thus, state-owned banks in Turkey continue to provide a viable 
and valuable alternative to the private financing of develop-
ment initiatives—despite concerted recent efforts to prepare 
the grounds for their eventual privatisation. It is clear that SOBs 
need not rely on profit imperatives in order to sustainably pro-
vide a valued range of financial services.
However, unless current neoliberal government plans are over-
turned and a more progressive vision of the developmental role 
of the SOBs is clarified and then implemented, eventually they 
will end up effectively mimicking profit-maximising private 
banks. 
And Turkey will end up paying a high price, not only in terms of 
the lost opportunities for development but also in terms of the 
heightened probabilities of financial speculation and instabil-
ity. 
State ownership of these banks needs to be defended but, just 
as important, new forms of more democratic ownership and 
control need to be instituted in order to maximise their poten-
tial.
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